Evidence from 43 countries that disease leaves cultures unchanged in the short-term.

Did cultures change shortly after, and in response to, the COVID-19 outbreak? If so, then in what way? We study these questions for a set of macro-cultural dimensions: collectivism/individualism, duty/joy, traditionalism/autonomy, and pro-fertility/individual-choice norms. We also study specific perceptions and norms like perceived threats to society (e.g. immigration) and hygiene norms. We draw on Evolutionary Modernization Theory, Parasite Stress Theory, and the Behavioural Immune System, and existing evidence, to make an overarching prediction: the COVID-19 pandemic should increase collectivism, duty, traditionalism, conformity (i.e. pro-fertility), and outgroup prejudice. We derive specific hypotheses from this prediction and use survey data from 29,761 respondents, in 55 cities and 43 countries, collected before (April-December 2019) and recently after the emergence of COVID-19 (April-June 2020) to test them. We exploit variation in disease intensity across regions to test potential mechanisms behind any changes. The macro-cultural dimensions remained stable. In contrast, specific perceptions and norms related to the pandemic changed: norms of hygiene substantially increased as did perceived threats related to disease. Taken together, our findings imply that macro-cultural dimensions are primarily stable while specific perceptions and norms, particularly those related to the pandemic, can change rapidly. Our findings provide new evidence for theories of cultural change and have implications for policy, public health, daily life, and future trajectories of our societies.

Anger and disgust shape judgments of social sanctions across cultures, especially in high individual autonomy societies.

When someone violates a social norm, others may think that some sanction would be appropriate. We examine how the experience of emotions like anger and disgust relate to the judged appropriateness of sanctions, in a pre-registered analysis of data from a large-scale study in 56 societies. Across the world, we find that individuals who experience anger and disgust over a norm violation are more likely to endorse confrontation, ostracism and, to a smaller extent, gossip. Moreover, we find that the experience of anger is consistently the strongest predictor of judgments of confrontation, compared to other emotions. Although the link between state-based emotions and judgments may seem universal, its strength varies across countries. Aligned with theoretical predictions, this link is stronger in societies, and among individuals, that place higher value on individual autonomy. Thus, autonomy values may increase the role that emotions play in guiding judgments of social sanctions.

Assessing the effects of pandemic risk on cooperation and social norms using a before-after Covid-19 comparison in two long-term experiments.

How does threat from disease shape our cooperative actions and the social norms that guide such behaviour? To study these questions, we draw on a collective-risk social dilemma experiment that we ran before the emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic (Wave 1, 2018) and compare this to its exact replication, sampling from the same population, that we conducted during the first wave of the pandemic (Wave 2, 2020). Tightness-looseness theory predicts and evidence generally supports that both cooperation and accompanying social norms should increase, yet, we mostly did not find this. Contributions, the probability of reaching the threshold (cooperation), and the contents of the social norm (how much people should contribute) remained similar across the waves, although the strength of these social norms were slightly greater in Wave 2. We also study whether the results from Wave 1 that should not be affected by the pandemic-the relationship between social norms and cooperation and specific behavioural types-replicate in Wave 2 and find that these results generally hold. Overall, our work demonstrates that social norms are important drivers of cooperation, yet, communicable diseases, at least in the short term, have little or no effects on either.

Changes in social norms during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic across 43 countries.

The emergence of COVID-19 dramatically changed social behavior across societies and contexts. Here we study whether social norms also changed. Specifically, we study this question for cultural tightness (the degree to which societies generally have strong norms), specific social norms (e.g. stealing, hand washing), and norms about enforcement, using survey data from 30,431 respondents in 43 countries recorded before and in the early stages following the emergence of COVID-19. Using variation in disease intensity, we shed light on the mechanisms predicting changes in social norm measures. We find evidence that, after the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, hand washing norms increased while tightness and punishing frequency slightly decreased but observe no evidence for a robust change in most other norms. Thus, at least in the short term, our findings suggest that cultures are largely stable to pandemic threats except in those norms, hand washing in this case, that are perceived to be directly relevant to dealing with the collective threat.

Risk, sanctions and norm change: the formation and decay of social distancing norms.

Global challenges like the climate crisis and pandemic outbreaks require collective responses where people quickly adapt to changing circumstances. Social norms are potential solutions, but only if they themselves are flexible enough. The COVID-19 pandemic provided a unique opportunity to study norm formation and decay in real-world contexts. We tracked empirical and normative expectations about social distancing and empirical and normative expectations of sanctioning from June 2021 to February 2022 to explore how norms and meta norms evolved as COVID-19 risk decreased and increased. We found that norms and meta norms partially coevolve with risk dynamics, although they recover with some delay. This implies that norms should be enforced as soon as risk increases. We therefore tested how sanctioning intentions vary for different hypothetical norms and find them to increase with a clear meta norm of sanctioning, yet decrease with a clear social norm of distance. In conclusion, social norms evolve spontaneously with changing risk, but might not be adaptive enough when the lack of meta norms of sanctioning introduce tolerance for norm violations. Moreover, norm nudges can potentially have negative externalities if strengthening the social norm increases tolerance for norm violations. These results put some limits to social norms as solutions to guide behaviour under risk. This article is part of the theme issue 'Social norm change: drivers and consequences'.

Social norm change: drivers and consequences.

Social norms research is booming. In recent years, several experts have recommended using social norms (unwritten rules that prescribe what people ought or ought not to do) to confront the societal, environmental and health challenges our societies face. If we are to do so, a better understanding is required of how social norms themselves emerge, evolve and respond to these challenges. Social norms have long been used as post hoc explanations of behaviour or are seen as stable social constructs. Yet norms evolve dynamically with the changing group processes (e.g. political polarization, kinship structures) and societal challenges (e.g. pandemics, climate change) for which they are presented as solutions. The Theme Issue 'Social norm change: drivers and consequences' contains 14 contributions that present state-of-the-art approaches to understand what generates social norm change and how this impacts our societies. Contributions give insight into (i) the identification of norms, norm change and their effect on behaviour; (ii) drivers and consequences of spontaneous norm change; and (iii) how norm change can be engineered to promote desired behavioural change. This article is part of the theme issue 'Social norm change: drivers and consequences'.

Vaccine-hesitant people misperceive the social norm of vaccination.

Vaccine hesitancy is one of the main threats to global health, as became clear once more during the COVID-19 pandemic. Vaccination campaigns could benefit from appeals to social norms to promote vaccination, but without awareness of the social norm in place any intervention relying on social norms may backfire. We present a two-step approach of social norm diagnosis and intervention that identifies both whether a vaccination norm exists or develops over time and corrects misperceptions. In two studies (N=887 and N=412) conducted in Rome, Italy from June to August 2021 (during the first COVID-19 vaccination campaign), we show that vaccine-hesitant people strongly underestimated vaccine acceptance rates for COVID-19 despite increases in region-wide vaccination rates. This suggests a false consensus bias on the social norm of vaccination. We presented a subgroup of vaccine-hesitant people with the accurate vaccine acceptance rates (both planned uptake and vaccine approval) and tested if this social information would lower their vaccine hesitancy. We do not find clear effects, most likely because of the introduction of the COVID-19 health certificate (the "green pass") that was implemented during our data collection. The green pass reduced both misperceptions in the social norm and vaccine hesitancy, thus undermining our treatment effect. We conclude that to alleviate misperceptions on the social norm of vaccination in early stages of the vaccination campaign governments and media should report not just the current vaccination rate, but also about vaccination intentions and approval.

The voice of few, the opinions of many: evidence of social biases in Twitter COVID-19 fake news sharing.

Online platforms play a relevant role in the creation and diffusion of false or misleading news. Concerningly, the COVID-19 pandemic is shaping a communication network which reflects the emergence of collective attention towards a topic that rapidly gained universal interest. Here, we characterize the dynamics of this network on Twitter, analysing how unreliable content distributes among its users. We find that a minority of accounts is responsible for the majority of the misinformation circulating online, and identify two categories of users: a few active ones, playing the role of 'creators', and a majority playing the role of 'consumers'. The relative proportion of these groups (approx. 14% creators-86% consumers) appears stable over time: consumers are mostly exposed to the opinions of a vocal minority of creators (which are the origin of 82% of fake content in our data), that could be mistakenly understood as representative of the majority of users. The corresponding pressure from a perceived majority is identified as a potential driver of the ongoing COVID-19 infodemic.

A research agenda for the study of social norm change.

Social norms have been investigated across many disciplines for many years, but until recently, studies mainly provided indirect, implicit and correlational support for the role of social norms in driving behaviour. To understand how social norms, and in particular social norm change, can generate a large-scale behavioural change to deal with some of the most pressing challenges of our current societies, such as climate change and vaccine hesitancy, we discuss and review several recent advances in social norm research that enable a more precise underpinning of the role of social norms: how to identify their existence, how to establish their causal effect on behaviour and when norm change may pass tipping points. We advocate future research on social norms to study norm change through a mechanism-based approach that integrates experimental and computational methods in theory-driven, empirically calibrated agent-based models. As such, social norm research may move beyond unequivocal praising of social norms as the missing link between self-interested behaviour and observed cooperation or as the explanation for (the lack of) social tipping. It provides the toolkit to understand explicitly where, when and how social norms can be a solution to solve large-scale problems, but also to recognize their limits. This article is part of the theme issue 'Emergent phenomena in complex physical and socio-technical systems: from cells to societies'.

Evidence from a long-term experiment that collective risks change social norms and promote cooperation.

Social norms can help solve pressing societal challenges, from mitigating climate change to reducing the spread of infectious diseases. Despite their relevance, how norms shape cooperation among strangers remains insufficiently understood. Influential theories also suggest that the level of threat faced by different societies plays a key role in the strength of the norms that cultures evolve. Still little causal evidence has been collected. Here we deal with this dual challenge using a 30-day collective-risk social dilemma experiment to measure norm change in a controlled setting. We ask whether a looming risk of collective loss increases the strength of cooperative social norms that may avert it. We find that social norms predict cooperation, causally affect behavior, and that higher risk leads to stronger social norms that are more resistant to erosion when the risk changes. Taken together, our results demonstrate the causal effect of social norms in promoting cooperation and their role in making behavior resilient in the face of exogenous change.

Perceptions of the appropriate response to norm violation in 57 societies.

Norm enforcement may be important for resolving conflicts and promoting cooperation. However, little is known about how preferred responses to norm violations vary across cultures and across domains. In a preregistered study of 57 countries (using convenience samples of 22,863 students and non-students), we measured perceptions of the appropriateness of various responses to a violation of a cooperative norm and to atypical social behaviors. Our findings highlight both cultural universals and cultural variation. We find a universal negative relation between appropriateness ratings of norm violations and appropriateness ratings of responses in the form of confrontation, social ostracism and gossip. Moreover, we find the country variation in the appropriateness of sanctions to be consistent across different norm violations but not across different sanctions. Specifically, in those countries where use of physical confrontation and social ostracism is rated as less appropriate, gossip is rated as more appropriate.

Evolutionary advantages of turning points in human cooperative behaviour.

Cooperation is crucial to overcome some of the most pressing social challenges of our times, such as the spreading of infectious diseases, corruption and environmental conservation. Yet, how cooperation emerges and persists is still a puzzle for social scientists. Since human cooperation is individually costly, cooperative attitudes should have been eliminated by natural selection in favour of selfishness. Yet, cooperation is common in human societies, so there must be some features which make it evolutionarily advantageous. Using a cognitive inspired model of human cooperation, recent work Realpe-Gómez (2018) has reported signatures of criticality in human cooperative groups. Theoretical evidence suggests that being poised at a critical point provides evolutionary advantages to groups by enhancing responsiveness of these systems to external attacks. After showing that signatures of criticality can be detected in human cooperative groups composed by Moody Conditional Cooperators, in this work we show that being poised close to a turning point enhances the fitness and make individuals more resistant to invasions by free riders.

Peer effects on compliance with extortive requests.

We conduct laboratory experiments to study peer effects on compliance with extortive requests. To this aim, we use an "extortion game" with multiple victims. In agreement with our hypothesis, our results show that when the information on peers' behavior is available, compliance with appropriative requests is triggered by conformism among victims rather than by punishment. Moreover, we find that extorted sums are rather small, requests are proportional to the victim's earnings, similar across victims, and are significantly lower when the extorter self-selects into this role. Punishment is rare, but effective. Finally, our results indicate that fairness concerns matter even in a context of extra-legal taxation, shaping both extorters' requests and victims' compliance.

Balancing selfishness and norm conformity can explain human behavior in large-scale prisoner's dilemma games and can poise human groups near criticality.

Cooperation is central to the success of human societies as it is crucial for overcoming some of the most pressing social challenges of our time; still, how human cooperation is achieved and may persist is a main puzzle in the social and biological sciences. Recently, scholars have recognized the importance of social norms as solutions to major local and large-scale collective action problems, from the management of water resources to the reduction of smoking in public places to the change in fertility practices. Yet a well-founded model of the effect of social norms on human cooperation is still lacking. Using statistical-physics techniques and integrating findings from cognitive and behavioral sciences, we present an analytically tractable model in which individuals base their decisions to cooperate both on the economic rewards they obtain and on the degree to which their action complies with social norms. Results from this parsimonious model are in agreement with observations in recent large-scale experiments with humans. We also find the phase diagram of the model and show that the experimental human group is poised near a critical point, a regime where recent work suggests living systems respond to changing external conditions in an efficient and coordinated manner.

Counter-Punishment, Communication, and Cooperation among Partners.

We study how communication affects cooperation in an experimental public goods environment with punishment and counter-punishment opportunities. Participants interacted over 30 rounds in fixed groups with fixed identifiers that allowed them to trace other group members' behavior over time. The two dimensions of communication we study are asking for a specific contribution level and having to express oneself when choosing to counter-punish. We conduct four experimental treatments, all involving a contribution stage, a punishment stage, and a counter-punishment stage in each round. In the first treatment communication is not possible at any of the stages. The second treatment allows participants to ask for a contribution level at the punishment stage and in the third treatment participants are required to send a message if they decide to counter-punish. The fourth combines the two communication channels of the second and third treatments. We find that the three treatments involving communication at any of the two relevant stages lead to significantly higher contributions than the baseline treatment. We find no difference between the three treatments with communication. We also relate our results to previous results from treatments without counter-punishment opportunities and do not find that the presence of counter-punishment leads to lower cooperation level. The overall pattern of results shows that given fixed identifiers the key factor is the presence of communication. Whenever communication is possible contributions and earnings are higher than when it is not, regardless of counter-punishment opportunities.

Are Some Countries More Honest than Others? Evidence from a Tax Compliance Experiment in Sweden and Italy.

This study examines cultural differences in ordinary dishonesty between Italy and Sweden, two countries with different reputations for trustworthiness and probity. Exploiting a set of cross-cultural tax compliance experiments, we find that the average level of tax evasion (as a measure of ordinary dishonesty) does not differ significantly between Swedes and Italians. However, we also uncover differences in national "styles" of dishonesty. Specifically, while Swedes are more likely to be either completely honest or completely dishonest in their fiscal declarations, Italians are more prone to fudging (i.e., cheating by a small amount). We discuss the implications of these findings for the evolution and enforcement of honesty norms.

"Willing to Pay?" Tax Compliance in Britain and Italy: An Experimental Analysis.

As shown by the recent crisis, tax evasion poses a significant problem for countries such as Greece, Spain and Italy. While these societies certainly possess weaker fiscal institutions as compared to other EU members, might broader cultural differences between northern and southern Europe also help to explain citizens' (un)willingness to pay their taxes? To address this question, we conduct laboratory experiments in the UK and Italy, two countries which straddle this North-South divide. Our design allows us to examine citizens' willingness to contribute to public goods via taxes while holding institutions constant. We report a surprising result: when faced with identical tax institutions, redistribution rules and audit probabilities, Italian participants are significantly more likely to comply than Britons. Overall, our findings cast doubt upon "culturalist" arguments that would attribute cross-country differences in tax compliance to the lack of morality amongst southern European taxpayers.

Perceived legitimacy of normative expectations motivates compliance with social norms when nobody is watching.

Three main motivations can explain compliance with social norms: fear of peer punishment, the desire for others' esteem and the desire to meet others' expectations. Though all play a role, only the desire to meet others' expectations can sustain compliance when neither public nor private monitoring is possible. Theoretical models have shown that such desire can indeed sustain social norms, but empirical evidence is lacking. Moreover it is unclear whether this desire ranges over others' "empirical" or "normative" expectations. We propose a new experimental design to isolate this motivation and to investigate what kind of expectations people are inclined to meet. Results indicate that, when nobody can assign either material or immaterial sanctions, the perceived legitimacy of others' normative expectations can motivate a significant number of people to comply with costly social norms.

Punish and voice: punishment enhances cooperation when combined with norm-signalling.

Material punishment has been suggested to play a key role in sustaining human cooperation. Experimental findings, however, show that inflicting mere material costs does not always increase cooperation and may even have detrimental effects. Indeed, ethnographic evidence suggests that the most typical punishing strategies in human ecologies (e.g., gossip, derision, blame and criticism) naturally combine normative information with material punishment. Using laboratory experiments with humans, we show that the interaction of norm communication and material punishment leads to higher and more stable cooperation at a lower cost for the group than when used separately. In this work, we argue and provide experimental evidence that successful human cooperation is the outcome of the interaction between instrumental decision-making and the norm psychology humans are provided with. Norm psychology is a cognitive machinery to detect and reason upon norms that is characterized by a salience mechanism devoted to track how much a norm is prominent within a group. We test our hypothesis both in the laboratory and with an agent-based model. The agent-based model incorporates fundamental aspects of norm psychology absent from previous work. The combination of these methods allows us to provide an explanation for the proximate mechanisms behind the observed cooperative behaviour. The consistency between the two sources of data supports our hypothesis that cooperation is a product of norm psychology solicited by norm-signalling and coercive devices.